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Annuler un transfert taptap send4/27/2024 ![]() (A rule “specific enough” would constitute a template for the very same text: a duplicating or ingeminating device.) With or without rules, texts turn. Lacking rules specific enough to control it, a text is buffeted by chance associations, not only during its composition but all the more during the course of its interpretation. The principle applies analogously to texts. There exist no reliable rules, unless we simply accept chance as the rule. Chigurh himself is seriously injured in an automobile accident caused only by his chance presence at the time and place of occurrence. 1ĢThe fictional Chigurh illustrates a principle: despite following a rule of conduct, a life remains subject to chance. Having decided on a killing, he faces his soon-to-be-deceased counterpart with a question: “If the rule you followed led you to this, of what use was the rule?”. Chigurh often dispenses with the toss, acting directly as an agent of chance. The toss establishes a differential binary: heads or tails, live or die, no ambiguity, no argument. I thank Jessamine Batario and Jeannie McKetta for essential aid in (.)ġ The sociopathic killer Anton Chigurh, a creation of novelist Cormac McCarthy, enjoys using a coin toss to decide the fate of people he encounters. L’expérience du flou et du vaporeux rappelle l’arbitraire des codes culturels à l’œuvre dans l’évaluation des degrés de réalisme ou de vérité dans la représentation. Des peintures révèlent des facteurs de flou et de vaporeux qui procurent le sentiment d’échelle absent de la projection numérique. L’œuvre contemporaine dans nombre de médias - la photo, le cinéma, la vidéo, l’imagerie informatique - continue à explorer le jeu cognitif entre la signification conceptuelle et la sensation physique, mais certaines formes de peinture demeurent toujours les plus efficaces. ![]() La peinture du 19 e siècle a ouvert un dangereux fossé entre signification et sensation, entre l’image projetée et la matérialité de sa base représentative. Une fois l’image transférée de l’échelle miniature des téléphones portables à l’échelle monumentale de la projection numérique commerciale - un transfert accompli sans changement apparent de définition -, nous perdons la tension entre notre perception de l’image et la matérialité mise en œuvre dans sa production. Il semblait alors, et il peut sembler aujourd’hui, que la pensée abstraite avait été coupée de tout fondement dans le monde matériel de l’être et de la sensation physique. Les savants et même certains philosophes communiquaient par des symboles mathématiques tacites, non par le langage commun. Devant les signes familiers de procès représentatifs et la rhétorique filtrée par ces technologies, nous nous trouvons en train de re-expérimenter l’anxiété des débuts de l’âge atomique lorsque les humanistes pensaient avoir perdu leur place dans le débat moral sur le progrès scientifique. La photographie numérique et d’autres sources électroniques de représentation génèrent des images de haute définition tellement uniforme que l’œil ne détecte guère de transformation entre l’apparence d’objets physiques et leurs substituts projetés. Blur and fuzz are experiential reminders of the arbitrary cultural codes in operation for the assessment of degrees of realism or truth in representation. Paintings reveal factors of blur and fuzz that provide the sense of scale missing from digital projection. Contemporary work in many media-photography, film, video, computer electronics-continues to investigate the cognitive play of conceptual meaning and physical feel, but certain forms of painting continue to be the most effective. Nineteenth-century painting developed an uncomfortable rift between meaning and feel, between the projected image and the materiality of its representational basis. With the transference of imagery from the miniature scale of cell phones to the grand scale of commercial digital projection-accomplished without apparent change in resolution-we lose the tension between our perception of the image and the materiality involved in its production. It seemed then, as it may seem now, that abstract thinking had been cut loose from any foundation in the material world of physical being and feeling. The scientists and even some philosophers were communicating through unvoiced mathematical symbols, not common words. With familiar signs of representational process and rhetoric screened out by these technologies, we find ourselves re-experiencing the anxiety of the early atomic age when humanists believed they had lost their place within a moral debate over progress in science. Digital photography and other electronic sources of representation generate images of such uniformly high resolution that the eye detects little transformation between the appearance of physical objects and their projected surrogates.
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